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Introduction
With the conjoined advent of powerful computing capabilities and rich data sets, the empirical
evaluation of complex structural models with equilibrium data is becoming prevalent, particularly in
the analysis of social networks and industrial organization. However, in such models, multiple equi-
libria are the norm rather than the exception. Though multiplicity of equilibria and identi¯ability of
the model's structural parameters are conceptually distinct, the former often leads to a failure of the
latter, thereby invalidating traditional inference methods. This is generally remedied by imposing
additional assumptions to achieve identi¯cation, such as imposing an equilibrium selection mecha-
nism or a re¯nement of the equilibrium concept. Manski (1993) and Jovanovic (1989) were among
the ¯rst to advocate a new inference approach that dispenses with identi¯cation assumptions and
delivers con¯dence regions for partially identi¯ed structural parameters. A large literature has de-
veloped on the general problem of inference on partially identi¯ed parameters de¯ned as minimizers
of objective functions or more speci¯cally as solutions to moment inequality restrictions, following
the seminal work of Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007).
In structural estimation using equilibrium conditions, the partial identi¯cation approach was ini-
tially applied, as in Haile and Tamer (2003), to achieve simple and robust inference from implications
of the model in the form of a small number of moment inequalities. This partial identi¯cation ap-
proach was applied to inference in games by Andrews, Berry, and Jia (2003), Pakes, Porter, Ho, and
Ishii (2004), Ciliberto and Tamer (2009), Jia (2008) among others. However, this approach brings
only part of the empirical content of the model to bear on the estimation, resulting in unnecessary
loss of informativeness. In models with multiple equilibria and no additional prior information,
nothing is known of the equilibrium selection mechanism. If a particular equilibrium selection mech-
anism is posited, the model likelihood can be derived and inference based on it. Jovanovic (1989)
characterizes compatibility of an economic structure with the true data generating process as the
existence of some (unknown) equilibrium selection mechanism, for which the likelihood is equal to
the true data generating mechanism. Berry and Tamer (2006) de¯ne the identi¯ed set as the collec-
tion of structural parameter values for which the structure is compatible with the data generating
mechanism in the sense of Jovanovic (1989). This de¯nition of the identi¯ed set is not directly
conducive to inference, as it involves an in¯nite dimensional (nuisance) parameter (the equilibrium
selection mechanism). However, in the case of ¯nite non cooperative games of complete information,
Galichon and Henry (2011) and Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari (2011) show equivalence of
the Jovanovic (1989) de¯nition with a system of inequalities. Hence, they show that the empirical
content of such models is characterized by a ¯nite collection of moment inequalities.INFERENCE IN GAMES 3
A large literature has developed on inference in moment inequality models since the seminal
contribution of Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007). We discuss and review it in Section 3.
However, a major challenge in the framework of this paper is that the number of inequalities char-
acterizing the empirical content of the model grows exponentially with the number of equilibrium
strategy pro¯les. Hence the combinatorial optimization approach that we propose in this paper is
to the best of our knowledge the only computationally feasible inference procedure for empirically
relevant incomplete economic structures. The growing literature on \inference with many moment
inequalities" addresses theoretical issues relating to the case, where the number of inequalities grows
with sample size and does not alleviate the computational burden mentioned here. This problem
of exponential complexity goes a long way towards explaining the dearth of empirical studies us-
ing partial identi¯cation in such models. However, abandoning this partial identi¯cation approach
would mean abandoning robust inference not only in non cooperative games of perfect information
but also in large classes of models that share exactly the same feature, and fall into the framework of
this paper. They include cooperative games, such as matching games and network formation games,
revealed preference analysis of spacial preferences and matching markets and instrumental variable
models of discrete choice.
The objective of this paper is to propose a combinatorial solution to this problem, where the
number of inequality restrictions grows exponentially with the number of strategy pro¯les or dis-
crete outcomes. Ekeland, Galichon, and Henry (2010) have shown that generic partial identi¯cation
problems can be formulated as optimal transportation problems. Developing ideas in Galichon and
Henry (2011), we exploit the special structure of discrete choice problems and show that correct
speci¯cation can be formulated as a problem of maximizing °ow through a network, and that the
identi¯ed set can be obtained from the Max-Flow Min-Cut Theorem. The dual problems of max-
imizing °ow through a network and ¯nding a minimum capacity cut are classics in combinatorial
optimization and operations research, with applications in many areas such as tra±c, communi-
cations, routing and scheduling; see, for example Schrijver (2004) for the theory and history, and
Ahuja, Magnanti, and Orlin (1993) for numerous applications. To our knowledge this is the ¯rst
application of the Max-Flow Min-Cut Theorem to statistical inference for equilibrium models. We
apply this powerful combinatorial method to the problem of constructing con¯dence regions for
structural parameters. We construct a functional quantile for the bootstrap process using a linear
computing time algorithm and replace the unknown empirical process by this quantile in the system
of moment inequalities to obtain the least relaxation of the moment inequalities, hence maximum
informativeness, while controlling the con¯dence level of the covering region. Since the procedure
involves bootstrapping the empirical process only, it does not su®er from the problems of boot-
strap validity in partially identi¯ed models described in Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007)4 MARC HENRY, ROMUALD M¶ EANGO AND MAURICE QUEYRANNE
and Bugni (2010). We illustrate and assess our procedure on a very simple full information game
with 2 players and 3 strategies, easily derived equilibria and yet a large number of inequalities to
characterize its empirical content (namely 127). We simulate the game under a variety of parameter
values and assumptions on the data generating process and with explanatory variables. Finally,
we illustrate the approach, the procedure and the interpretation of results on an application to the
determinants of long term elderly care choices of American families.
In summary, the main contributions of this paper are as follows:
1. We present a uni¯ed approach to inference in incomplete structural models.
2. We provide a simpli¯ed and insightful new proof for a characterization of the identi¯ed set.
3. We present a computationally e±cient, combinatorial procedure that allows feasible infer-
ence in empirically relevant incomplete structural models. We demonstrate its practical
e±ciency in extensive simulations of a simple game.
4. We apply this methodology to an empirical example and demonstrate the type of econo-
metric analysis and insights that it allows.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the general framework and the ob-
ject of study. Section 2 derives the characterization of the identi¯ed set with the Min-Cut Max-Flow
Theorem. Section 3 describes the combinatorial procedure to e±ciently construct the con¯dence
region. Section 4 contains the simulation evidence and Section 5 the empirical application. The last
section concludes. Proofs are collected in an appendix.
1. Analytical framework
1.1. Model speci¯cation. We consider the following model speci¯cation.
Y 2 G(X;";µ); (1.1)
where Y is an observable outcome variable, which takes values in a ¯nite set Y = fy1;:::;yKg,
X is a vector of exogenous explanatory variables with domain X, " is a vector of unobservable
heterogeneity variables with domain ¥ ½ Rl and µ 2 £ ½ Rd is a vector of unknown parameters.
Finally, G : (X;") ¶ G(X;";µ) is a multi-valued mapping. The random elements X, Y and "
are de¯ned on a common probability space (­;F;P). The sample consists in n observational units
i = 1;:::;n, which are independent and identical in distribution. To each unit i is attached a vector
(Yi;Xi;"i), only the ¯rst two elements of which shall be observed. For each potential outcome
y 2 Y, we denote by P(yjX) the conditional probability P(Y = yjX). If Z is a subset of Y, P(ZjX)
will denote
P
y2Z P(yjX). It is important to emphasize here the fact that P(:jX) denotes the true
outcome data generating process, which is unknown, but can be estimated from the data. It is notINFERENCE IN GAMES 5
a function of the structural parameter vector and cannot be construed as the likelihood from the
model. The vector of unobservable variables " in the economic structure has conditional cumulative
distribution function F("jX;µ) for some known function F parameterized by µ (the same notation is
used for the parameters of the model correspondence and for the parameters of the error distribution
to indicate that they may have common components). The economic structure is summarized by the
multi-valued mapping G. A special case of speci¯cation (1.1) arises when G is a function, in which
case model (1.1) is a nonlinear non separable single equation discrete choice model as in Chesher
(2010). Here, however, we entertain the possibility of G having multiple values arising from multiple
equilibria, data censoring or endogeneity. G is entirely given by the economic structural model, up
to an unknown parameter vector µ.
The analytical framework, concepts and procedures proposed throughout the paper will be illus-
trated and discussed with the following simple example.
Example 1 (Partnership game). Our example is a simple non cooperative full information game of
complementarities.
² Strategies: There are two players, who simultaneously decide, whether to invest strongly
(strategy H), weakly (strategy L) or not at all (strategy O) in a partnership.
² Payoffs: Players pay a cost c ¸ 0 (respectively 2c) for a weak (respectively strong) in-
vestment. Bene¯ts that accrue to players depend on the overall level of investment in the
partnership and explanatory variables Ji, i = 1;2, where Ji = 1 if player i is female, and
zero otherwise. The bene¯ts for player i are 3c(1+¯Ji) in case both players invest strongly,
2c(1 + ¯Ji) in case one player invests weakly and the other strongly and c(1 + ¯Ji) in case
both players invest weakly. Finally player i also experiences an idiosyncratic random par-
ticipation payo® "i, i = 1;2 with a density with respect to Lebesgue measure. The payo®
matrix for the game is given in Table 1.
² Equilibrium concept: We assume that outcomes are Nash equilibria in pure strategies.
Other equilibrium concepts could be entertained, in particular with mixed strategies, as will
be discussed in Section 3.1 and illustrated in the empirical application.
The strategies, payo®s and equilibrium concept together de¯ne the economic structure. Y is an ob-
served equilibrium strategy pro¯le. J = (J1;J2) is also observed by the analyst. The idiosyncratic
participation bene¯t " = ("1;"2) is not, but it is common knowledge to the players. The structural
parameter vector is µ = (c;¯). The equilibrium correspondence, i.e., the set of equilibria for each
value of ", J and µ, can be easily derived, and de¯nes the multi-valued mapping G in model spec-
i¯cation (1.1), which is represented in the ("1;"2) space in Figure 1 for the case ¯ = 0. Since we6 MARC HENRY, ROMUALD M¶ EANGO AND MAURICE QUEYRANNE
Table 1. Payo® matrix for the partnership game. In each cell, the top expression is




H 3c(1 + ¯Ji) ¡ 2c + "1 2c(1 + ¯Ji) ¡ 2c + "1 ¡2c + "1
3c(1 + ¯Ji) ¡ 2c + "2 2c(1 + ¯Ji) ¡ c + "2 0
L 2c(1 + ¯Ji) ¡ c + "1 c(1 + ¯Ji) ¡ c + "1 ¡c + "1
2c(1 + ¯Ji) ¡ 2c + "2 c(1 + ¯Ji) ¡ c + "2 0
O 0 0 0
¡2c + "2 ¡c + "2 0
assume that " has absolutely continuous distribution with respect to Lebesgue measure, we do not
include zero probability predictions, such as fOO;OLg when "2 = c and "1 < ¡c for instance.
1.2. Object of inference. Model (1.1) has the fundamental feature that G is multi-valued (because
of multiple equilibria in the example above for instance). For a given value of (X;";µ), the model
predicts a set of possible outcomes G(X;";µ). Only one of them, namely Y , is actually realized, but
the economic structure is silent about how that particular Y was selected among G(X;";µ). In other
words, the economic structure holds no information about the equilibrium selection mechanism. If
the true (unknown) equilibrium selection mechanism is denoted ¼0(yj";X), which is a probability









¼0(yj";X)dF("jX;µ0); X-a.s.; for all y: (1.2)
Jovanovic (1989) points out that the incomplete model (incomplete because the equilibrium selection
is not modeled) is compatible with the true data generating process P(:jX) if and only if there exists
a (generally non unique) equilibrium selection mechanism ¼0 such that (1.2) holds. The identi¯ed
set is then de¯ned as the set £I of parameter values µ such that model (1.1) is compatible in the
sense of Jovanovic (1989).
De¯nition 1 (Identi¯ed set). The identi¯ed set £I is the set of parameter values µ 2 £ such that
















Figure 1. Representation of the equilibrium correspondence G(J;";µ) in the ("1;"2)
space, when ¯ = 0.
The identi¯ed set is empty if no value of the parameter can rationalize the data generating process,
in which case the structural model is misspeci¯ed. The identi¯ed set is a singleton in case of point
identi¯cation, which occurs if G happens to be single valued under the true parameter values (in
case c = ¯ = 0 in Example 1) or in very special cases under large support assumptions on X, as in
Tamer (2003). The identi¯ed set is totally uninformative, i.e., £I = £, in case the model has no
empirical content (if for instance G(X;";µ0) contains all selected outcome values for almost all " at
the true value µ0).
1.3. Applications of the framework. Speci¯cation (1.1), hence the inference procedure presented
in this paper, has a wide range of applications. Some of the most compelling ones are the empirical
analysis of games, instrumental variable models of discrete choice with endogeneity and revealed
preference analysis.8 MARC HENRY, ROMUALD M¶ EANGO AND MAURICE QUEYRANNE
² Empirical analysis of games: As illustrated in Example 1, Model (1.1) applies to the
empirical analysis of noncooperative games of perfect information (normal form games).
They include the classic entry game of Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) and Berry (1992) as
well as the social interaction game of Soetevent and Kooreman (2007). Noncooperative
games of private information make for a less compelling application of this framework as
point identi¯cation conditions are more easily derived and justi¯ed than in their perfect
information counterparts (see for instance Aradillas-Lopez (2010) and Bajari, Hahn, Hong,
and Ridder (2011) for a discussion). Finally, some cooperative games can be analyzed and
estimated within the present framework, in particular matching and social network for-
mation games, where the equilibrium correspondence is characterized by pairwise stability.
Uetake and Watanabe (2011) present an empirical analysis of entry by merger, where the
present inference procedure can be applied.
² Discrete choice models with endogeneity: Chesher, Rosen, and Smolinski (2011)
show that instrumental variable models of discrete choice fall under model (1.1) and they
use Theorem 1 of Galichon and Henry (2011) or equivalently Theorem 3.2 of Beresteanu,
Molchanov, and Molinari (2011) to characterize the identi¯ed set. The present work com-
plements Chesher, Rosen, and Smolinski (2011) in proposing the ¯rst feasible inference
procedure for such models.
² Revealed preference analysis: Henry and Mouri¯¶ e (2011) apply the inference pro-
cedure proposed here to analyze voting behaviour from a revealed preference standpoint.
The same approach can be applied to revealed preference testing in matching markets as
in Echenique, Lee, Shum, and Yenmez (2011) or the revealed preference approach to games
taken in Pakes, Porter, Ho, and Ishii (2004).
2. Operational characterization of the identified set
As noted in Berry and Tamer (2006), De¯nition 1 is not an operational de¯nition of the identi¯ed
set, as it includes the equilibrium selection mechanism as an in¯nite dimensional parameter. Galichon
and Henry (2011) and Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari (2011) show a characterization of the
identi¯ed set with a ¯nite collection of moment inequalities. In this section, we give an equivalent
characterization of the identi¯ed set, whose proof is much simpler and relies on the Min-Cut Max-
Flow Theorem, which brings classical e±cient combinatorial optimization methods to bear on the
problem. This will prove crucial for the feasibility of the inference procedure in realistic and relevant
empirical examples.INFERENCE IN GAMES 9
First, we set out the main heuristic for the operational characterization of the identi¯ed set.
Model speci¯cation (1.1) is a discrete choice model, hence the set Y of outcomes is ¯nite and the
correspondence G takes only a ¯nite number of values, which we label U = fu1;:::;uJg. Each u is
a set (possibly singleton) of outcomes in Y. Because the model is incomplete, it does not predict
the probabilities of individual outcomes in Y, but it predicts the probability of each combination
of equilibria listed in U. We denote these probabilities Q(ujX;µ) as they depend on the structural
parameter value.
De¯nition 2 (Predicted probabilities). For each u 2 U, we de¯ne Q(ujX;µ) := P(G(X;";µ) =
ujX;µ). If V is a subset of U, we write Q(V jX;µ) =
P
u2V Q(ujX;µ).
In most applications, it will be di±cult to obtain closed forms for Q(ujX;µ). However, " can
be randomly generated. Given a sample ("r)r=1;:::;R of simulated values, Q(ujX;µ) can be approx-
imated by
PR
r=1 1fu = G(X;"r;µ)g=R. Bajari, Hong, and Ryan (2010) propose an importance
sampling procedure that greatly reduces the computational burden of this stage of the inference.
The simulation procedure is now standard and cannot be avoided if one wishes, as we do here, to
exhaust the empirical content of the structural model.
Example 1 continued: In the partnership example with ¯ = 0, the model predicts the following
values for the equilibrium correspondence: U = f fOLg, fLH;OL;HHg, fHH;LH;OOg, fOOg,
fHH;OOg, fHH;LL;HL;LHg, fHH;LL;OO;HL;LHg, fHH;OO;HLg, fHH;HL;LOg, fLOgg.
The set Y of equilibrium strategy pro¯les (that may be observed) is fHH, HL, LH, LL, LO, OL,
OOg with 7 elements, while the set of predicted collections of equilibria (possible values of the equilib-
rium correspondence) U has 10 elements. The predicted probabilities can be computed in the following
way. For instance, Q(fOLgjc) = P("1 · ¡c and "2 · c) and Q(fHH;LH;OLgjc) = P(¡c · "1 ·
0 and "2 · c) and the remaining 8 probabilities are determined similarly from Figure 1.
The model structure imposes a set of restrictions on the relation between the predicted prob-
abilities of equilibrium combinations and the true probabilities of outcomes. For instance, the
predicted probability Q(fHH;LH;OLgjX;µ) in the above example cannot be larger than the sum
P(HH) + P(LH) + P(OL) of probabilities of occurrence of each individual equilibrium in u, since
Y is either HH, LH or OL, when u = fHH;LH;OLg is predicted. More generally, since P and Q




P(Y = y and U = ujX;µ) ·
X
y2u
P(Y = yjX;µ) =
X
y2u
P(yjX): (2.1)10 MARC HENRY, ROMUALD M¶ EANGO AND MAURICE QUEYRANNE
Note that Q(ujX;µ) may be strictly smaller than
P
y2u P(yjX) when some outcome y 2 u also
belongs to other combinations u0 that may arise under di®erent values of ", as its (marginal) prob-
ability P(yjX) must then be split between Q(ujX;µ) and the probabilities Q(u0jX;µ) of such other
combinations u0 2 U containing y. However, inequalities (2.1) do not exhaust the information in
the structure. They may all be satis¯ed and yet the structure may be incompatible with the data
generating process as the following example shows. Hence more inequalities will be needed as derived
below.
Example 1 continued: In the partnership example with ¯ = 0, suppose that the true equilibrium
selection mechanism is such that Q(fOLgjµ) = P(OL) > 0 and Q(fHH;LH;OLgjµ) = P(HH) +
P(LH) + P(OL). Then Q(fOLg [ fHH;LH;OLgjµ) = Q(fOLgjµ) + Q(fHH;LH;OLgjµ) >
P(HH) + P(LH) + P(OL) so that µ = 2 £I.
Extending this observation, consider a subset V µ U and de¯ne



























where the inequality is again due to the fact that some y 2 V [ may also belong to some u0 62 V .













This inequality must also hold for every realization x of X in the domain X of the explanatory















So far, we have shown implications of the model. It is far more di±cult to show that these implication
actually exhaust all the empirical content of the model, i.e., that they involve no loss of information
and constitute sharp bounds. In Theorem 1 below, we will show this with an appeal to the classicalINFERENCE IN GAMES 11
Max-Flow Min-Cut Theorem of combinatorial optimization, providing our characterization (2.2)
of the identi¯ed set. We thereby provide, for the case of a ¯nite set of possible outcomes, a new
and simpler proof of the characterization of the identi¯ed set with a ¯nite collection of inequalities,
without the complicated apparatus of the theory of random sets. This allows us to emphasize the
combinatorial optimization formulation of our inference problem, which is key to its tractable solution
in empirically relevant instances. Theorem 1 below also provides an alternative characterization
(2.3) of the identi¯ed set from the \dual" perspective of outcome subsets Z µ Y, in addition to the
preceding characterization (2.2) based on combination subsets V µ U, with the notation
Z\ := fu 2 U : u µ Zg and Z¡1 := fu 2 U : u \ Z 6= ?g:
This alternative characterization may be useful in situations where the number of possible outcomes
is much smaller than the number of possible combinations (as is the case in Example 1, where the
number of equilibrium outcomes (cardinality of Y) is 7, so the corresponding number of inequalities
to be checked is 27¡1 = 127, whereas the number of predicted equilibrium combinations (cardinality
of U) is 10, so the corresponding number of inequalities to check would be 210 ¡1 = 1023). Finally,
it is also equivalent to the characterization of the identi¯ed set ¯rst derived in Galichon and Henry
(2011) and Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari (2011), which we give in (2.4) in our notation.
Theorem 1. The identi¯ed set is
£I(P) =
½


































Theorem 1 gives three characterizations of the identi¯ed set £I(P), sometimes called sharp iden-
ti¯ed region in the literature. £I(P) contains all the values of the parameter such that (1.1) holds
and only such values. Moreover, all elements of £I(P) are observationally equivalent. Hence no
value of the parameter vector µ contained in £I(P) can be rejected on the basis of the information
available to the analyst. Thus, £I(P) completely characterizes the empirical content of the model.
Example 1 continued: To illustrate the computation of the identi¯ed set, consider the case, where
it is known that ¯ = 0. Assume that the true parameter value is c0 = 1=4 and the idiosyn-
cratic shocks are independent and uniformly distributed over [¡1=2;1=2]. Suppose further that the
true data generating process is equal to the distribution implied by a uniform equilibrium selection
rule, whereby all equilibrium strategy pro¯les within the equilibrium correspondence are selected with12 MARC HENRY, ROMUALD M¶ EANGO AND MAURICE QUEYRANNE
equal probability. For example, when "1 ¸ c0 = 1=4 and ¡1=4 = ¡c0 · "2 · 0, each strat-
egy pro¯le within the equilibrium correspondence fHH;HL;LOg is equally likely. The probabil-
ity distribution of the true data generating process in this case is de¯ned by P(HH) = 167=960,
P(OO) = 191=480, P(OL) = P(LO) = 1=12, P(LL) = 19=320 and P(HL) = P(LH) = 97=960.
The identi¯ed set is derived as the set of values of c such that the 27 ¡ 1 = 127 inequalities of the
form P(Z) ¸ Q(Z\jc), all Z µ fHH;HL;LH;LL;LO;OL;OOg, are satis¯ed. For instance, one
of those inequalities is 59=320 = P(LO or HL) ¸ Q(fLOgjc) = (1=2 ¡ c)2 if c · 1=2 and zero
otherwise. The identi¯ed set can be computed using a Min-Cut Max-Flow algorithm, which yields
[1=2¡1=
p
12;1=3] ' [0:2113;0:3333] where the lower bound of the interval happens to be the smallest
value of c > 0 for which the inequality in (2.3) with Z = fLO;OLg is satis¯ed, and the upper bound
happens to be the largest value for which that with Z = fHH;HL;LH;LL;OOg is satis¯ed.
As illustrated in Example 1, even in simple examples, where the equilibria are very easy to compute,
the exponential size of the characterization of the identi¯ed set is a severe computational burden that
is best approached with combinatorial optimization techniques, as developed in the next section.
3. Confidence region
3.1. Objective. We now turn to the problem of inference on £I(P) based on a sample of obser-
vations ((Y1;X1), :::, (Yn;Xn)). We seek coverage of the identi¯ed set with prescribed probability
1 ¡ ®, for some ® 2 (0;1). It would be tempting to appeal to the large literature on inference
in moment inequality models. This includes several proposals for the construction of con¯dence
regions covering each point in the identi¯ed set, which are generally preferred on account of the fact
that they may be more informative (although this may sometimes be misleading as pointed out in
Henry and Onatski (2011)). Such proposals include Section 5 of Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer
(2007), Romano and Shaikh (2008), Rosen (2008), Galichon and Henry (2009) and Andrews and
Soares (2010) among others. All of the above propose to construct con¯dence regions by inverting
speci¯cation tests. Hence, the con¯dence region is constructed through a search in the parameter
space, with a computationally demanding testing procedure at each parameter value visited in the
search. This becomes computationally infeasible for realistic parameter vector dimensions. With a
reasonably precise grid search and 5 parameters (for example), the number of points to be visited is
in the tens of billions. If the identi¯ed set is known to be convex, the search can be conducted from
a central point with a dichotomy in polar coordinates, yet it remains computationally impractical
to conduct a statistical procedure for each point in the search.
Hence, each parameter value in the search must be accepted or rejected based on a deterministic
criterion. This means the signi¯cance of the con¯dence region must be controlled independently ofINFERENCE IN GAMES 13
the parameter value. This will automatically produce a con¯dence region that covers the identi¯ed
set. Proposals for the construction of con¯dence regions covering the identi¯ed set include Cher-
nozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007), Romano and Shaikh (2010), Galichon and Henry (2006) and
Bugni (2010) among others. These can be applied to realistic models de¯ned by a small number of
moment inequality restrictions. However, a major challenge in the framework of this paper is that
the number of inequalities characterizing the empirical content of the model in Theorem 1 grows
exponentially with the cardinality of Y, which in the case of games is the number of equilibrium
strategy pro¯les (in the very simple partnership game of Example 1, the number of inequalities
is 127). Hence the combinatorial optimization approach that we propose in this paper is to the
best of our knowledge the only computationally feasible inference procedure for empirically relevant
economic structures de¯ned by ¯nite games and other models of discrete choice with endogeneity.
De¯nition 3 (Con¯dence region). A con¯dence region of asymptotic level 1 ¡ ® for the identi¯ed
set £I is de¯ned as a sequence of regions £n, n 2 N, satisfying liminfn P(£I µ £n) ¸ 1 ¡ ®.
We seek coverage of the set of values of the parameter µ such that Q(V jx;µ) · P(V [jx) for all
values of x and all subset V of U. Q is determined from the model, but P is unknown. However,
if we can construct random functions Pn(Ajx) that dominate the probabilities P(Ajx) for all values
of x and all subsets A of Y with high probability, then in particular, Pn(V [jx) ¸ P(V [jx) for
each x and each subset V of U. Hence any µ satisfying Q(V jx;µ) · P(V [jx) for all values of x
and all subsets V of U also satis¯es Q(V jx;µ) · Pn(V [jx) for all values of x and all subsets V
of U. There remains to control the level of con¯dence of the covering region, which is achieved by
requiring that Pn dominate P with probability asymptotically no less than the desired con¯dence
level. Equivalently, when working from characterization (2.4), we impose the same requirement for
dominated functions Pn. Hence the following assumption.














¸ 1 ¡ ®: (3.1)
Suppose now a value µ0 of the parameter vector belongs to the identi¯ed set £I. Then, by
Theorem 1, for all x and V µ U, Q(V jx;µ0) · P(V [jx), so that with probability tending to no less
than 1 ¡ ®, Q(V jx;µ0) · Pn(V [jx), hence Theorem 2.
Theorem 2 (Con¯dence region). Under Assumption 1, the sets
£I(Pn) =
½




(Q(V jx;µ) ¡ Pn(V [jx)) · 0
¾
(3.2)
de¯ne a con¯dence region of asymptotic level 1 ¡ ® for £I (according to De¯nition 3).14 MARC HENRY, ROMUALD M¶ EANGO AND MAURICE QUEYRANNE
Theorem 2 has the fundamental feature that it dissociates search in the parameter space (or
even possibly search over a class of models) from the statistical procedure necessary to control the
con¯dence level. The upper probabilities Pn can be determined independently of µ in a procedure
that is performed once and for all using only sample information, i.e. fully nonparametrically.
Once the upper probabilities are determined, probabilities Q over predicted sets of outcomes are
computed for particular chosen speci¯cations of the structure and values of the parameter, and
such speci¯cations and values are tested with inequalities de¯ning £n(Pn). This dissociation of the
statistical procedure to control con¯dence level from the search in the parameter space is crucial to
the computational feasibility of the proposed inference procedure in realistic examples (i.e. sample
sizes in the thousands, two-digit dimension of the parameter space and two-digit cardinality of the
set of observed outcomes, as in the application to teen behavior in Soetevent and Kooreman (2007),
or to entry in the airline market in Ciliberto and Tamer (2009)). The latter consider only equilibria
in pure strategies, as we have until now. If equilibria in mixed strategies are also considered, as in
Bajari, Hong, and Ryan (2010) and in the family bargaining application below, we can appeal to
results in Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari (2011) and Galichon and Henry (2011). In particular,
Galichon and Henry (2011) show that if the game has a Shapley regular core (which is the case in
the family bargaining application, by Lemma 2 of Galichon and Henry (2011)), then the identi¯ed







where G("jX;µ) is now a set of mixed strategies, i.e. a set of probabilities on the set of outcomes,
as opposed to a subset of the set of outcomes. Hence the methodology is be easily adapted, as in
the application of Section 5.
3.2. Control of con¯dence level. We now turn to the determination of random functions satis-
fying Assumption 1. First, for each y 2 Y, let ^ Pn(yjx) be the empirical analog (or more generally a
nonparametric estimator) of P(yjx) and ^ Pn(Ajx) =
P
y2A ^ Pn(yjx) for each A µ Y. A simple way of





[P(Ajx) ¡ ^ Pn(Ajx)]:
Denoting by c®
n the (1 ¡ ®)-quantile of the distribution of Mn, we have P(Mn · c®








[P(Ajx) ¡ ^ Pn(Ajx) ¡ c®
n] · 0
¶
¸ 1 ¡ ®; (3.4)INFERENCE IN GAMES 15
and the desired result with P(Ajx) = ^ Pn(Ajx)+c®
n. However, by construction, c®
n is independent of
A and x, so that the region obtained by plugging P(Ajx) = ^ Pn(Ajx) + c®
n into (3.2) of Theorem 2
will be unnecessarily conservative. We propose, instead, to replace c®
n by a function ¯n(Ajx) of
A and x, which we interpret as a functional quantile of the distribution of the random function







[P(Ajx) ¡ ^ Pn(Ajx) ¡ ¯n(Ajx)] · 0
¶
¸ 1 ¡ ®: (3.5)
We ¯rst give a heuristic description of our proposed functional quantile before precisely spelling out
the bootstrap procedure involved in approximating it. If X is ¯nite, the random matrix P(Ajx) ¡
^ Pn(Ajx), with A µ Y and x 2 X has a ¯nite population of possible realizations, at most one for each
possible sample draw. These realizations can be ordered according to the maximum entry in the
matrix maxx2X maxAµY[P(Ajx)¡ ^ Pn(Ajx)]. Now take all realizations that never exceed the (1¡®)-
quantile c®
n of maxx2X maxAµY[P(Ajx)¡ ^ Pn(Ajx)] and de¯ne Pn(Ajx) = ^ Pn(Ajx)+¯n(Ajx), where
¯n(Ajx) is the pointwise maximum over all realizations that never exceed c®
n. This guarantees that
the resulting con¯dence region obtained in (3.2) of Theorem 2 with Pn(Ajx) = ^ Pn(Ajx) + ¯n(Ajx)
will be valid and will be contained in the region obtained with Pn(Ajx) = ^ Pn(Ajx) + c®
n (hence
more informative than the latter). In case the conditioning variables are ¯nitely supported, it is well
known (see Singh (1981) and Bickel and Freedman (1981)) that the nonparametric bootstrap version
of c®
n is a valid approximation, which in turns guarantees the validity of the bootstrap procedure
described below. In case X has continuous components, Chernozhukov, Lee, and Rosen (2009)
derive the asymptotic distribution of the supremum (over X) of the conditional empirical process,
but nothing is known of its nonparametric bootstrap approximation.
De¯nition 4 (Nonparametric Bootstrap). Let P¤
n denote probability statements relative to the boot-
strap distribution and conditional on the original sample ((Y1;X1);:::;(Yn;Xn)). A bootstrap sample
takes the form ((Y ¤
1 ;X1);:::;(Y ¤
n;Xn)), where the explanatory variable is not resampled and for each
i, Y ¤
i is drawn from distribution ^ Pn(:jXi). Let ((Y b
1 ;X1);:::;(Y b
n;Xn)), b = 1;:::;B be a sequence
of B bootstrapped samples. Denote by ^ P¤
n(:j:) the bootstrap version (i.e., constructed identically from
a bootstrap sample) of ^ Pn(:j:) and ^ Pb
n, b = 1;:::;B its values taken on the B realized bootstrap
samples. Finally, for each A µ Y and 1 · j · n, denote ³¤
n(AjXj) =
P












[ ^ Pn(AjXj) ¡ ^ P¤
n(AjXj) ¡ ¯n(AjXj)] · 0
¶
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If there was a total order on the space of realizations of ³¤
n, we could choose ¯n as the quantile
of level 1 ¡ ® of the distribution of ³¤
n. However, the ³¤
n(¢;Xj)'s are random functions de¯ned on
2Y £fX1;:::;Xng, hence there is no such total order. We propose to determine ¯n from a subset of
dB(1 ¡ ®)e bootstrap realizations determined as follows (where bxc is the largest integer below x).
Step 1: Draw bootstrap samples ((Y b
1 ;X1);:::;(Y b
n;Xn)), for b = 1;:::;B.
Step 2: For each b · B, j · n and A µ Y, compute ³b
n(AjXj) = ^ Pn(AjXj) ¡ ^ Pb
n(AjXj).
Step 3: Discard at most a proportion ® of the bootstrap indices, and compute ¯n(AjXj)
as the maximum over the remaining bootstrap realizations ³b
n(AjXj).
Discarding at most B® among the bootstrap realizations guarantees the control of the level of
con¯dence, and we wish to choose the set D µ f1;:::;Bg of discarded indices so as to make ¯n as
small as possible, to maximize informativeness of the resulting con¯dence region. Again, if there was
a total order, we would be similarly discarding the B® largest realizations of ³b
n, e®ectively choosing
¯n as the quantile of the distribution of ³b
n, b = 1:::;B. Instead, we discard all realizations
of the matrix ³b
n(AjXj) that have at least one entry that strictly exceeds the (1 ¡ ®)-quantile of
wb = max1·j·n maxAµY ³b





wb : D µ f1;:::;Bg; jDj · B®
¾
: (3.6)








Figure 2. Stylized representation of the determination of the functional quantile ¯n in
a case without explanatory variables. The subsets A of Y are represented on the horizontal
axis, ranging from ? to Y. ³
d
n is one of two discarded realization of the empirical process
(dotted lines), whereas ³
k
n is one of three realizations that are not discarded (solid lines).
¯n is the pointwise maximum over the realizations that were not discarded (thick line).INFERENCE IN GAMES 17
Problem (3.6) can be solved by the following Bootstrap Realization Selection (BRS) algorithm:
BRS Step 1: For each b · B, set w0
b = max1·j·n
P
y2Y maxf0; ^ Pn(yjXj) ¡ ^ Pb
n(yjXj)g.
BRS Step 2: Let D be the set of indices b of the bB®c largest w0
b.
Proposition 1. The BRS algorithm determines an optimal solution to problem (3.6) in O(nBjYj)
time.
Remark 1. Problem (3.6) may have alternate optimum solutions. As observed by a referee, this may
arise when the sample size n is small, since ^ Pn(yjXj) and ^ Pb
n(yjXj) are multiples of 1=n and thus
distinct wb's are more likely to have the same value when the sample size n is small. In case of ties,
any optimum solution D to Problem (3.6) may be used to discard bootstrap realizations and determine
functions ¯n. If one desires a speci¯c tie-breaking rule, e.g., for robustness or reproducibility, then
we suggest the following lexicographic selection rule as a re¯nement to BRS Step 2: let wb be the
vector with components wb
j =
P
y2Y maxf0; ^ Pn(yjXj) ¡ ^ Pb
n(yjXj)g for j = 1;:::;n; and let [w]b be
the vector wb with its components sorted in nonincreasing order, i.e., with [w]b
1 = wb ¸ [w]b
2 ¸ ¢¢¢ ¸
[w]b
n = minj wb
j; then discard the bB®c bootstrap realizations b with the lexicographically largest vector
[w]b. In other words, we re¯ne problem (3.6) as lexmin
©
lexmax b62D[w]b : D µ f1;:::;Bg;jDj · B®
ª
where lexmin and lexmax denote the minimum and maximum relative to the lexicographic total order
of vectors with n components. This rule aims at simultaneously minimizing all the values ¯(AjXj)
without going through extensive additional computations.
In problem (3.6), we chose to minimize the maximum, over all j 2 f1;:::;ng and A µ Y, of
the non-discarded bootstrap realizations ³b
n(AjXj). Other objectives are possible, for example the
L1 objective
P
b= 2D wb. The main justi¯cation for the L1 norm objective maxd= 2D wb in (3.6) is
that it leads to a problem solvable in linear time. In contrast, the problem with an L1 objective is
computationally di±cult, namely NP-hard in the strong sense, as shown in the next result.
Proposition 2. Minimization of
©P
b= 2D wb : jDj · bB®c; D µ f1;:::;Bg
ª
is NP-hard in the
strong sense.
This result implies that unless P = NP, there exists no algorithm for this problem that runs
in polynomial time. This is a severe computational drawback relative to the linear-time algorithm
achieved with with BRS.
3.3. Search in the parameter space. Once the functional quantile has been computed, there
remains to search in the parameter space for the values of µ that satisfy (3.2). As shown in the
Lemma 1, the function to be optimized in characterization (2.2) of the identi¯ed set is supermodular.18 MARC HENRY, ROMUALD M¶ EANGO AND MAURICE QUEYRANNE
De¯nition 5 (Supermodular function). A set function ½ : A 7! ½(A) 2 R is called supermodular
(resp. submodular) if for all pairs of sets (A;B), ½(A [ B) + ½(A \ B) ¸ (resp. ·) ½(A) + ½(B).
Lemma 1. The function V 7! P(V [jx) is submodular for all x 2 X.
In the computation of £n(Pn), it may be desirable to require Pn(V [jx) to also be submodular
as a function of V µ U, so that the function to be maximized in (3.2) can be maximized using
submodular optimization techniques. This can be achieved by adding the following additional linear
constraints (see Schrijver (2004)): 8u 6= v 2 U;8V µ Unfu;vg; j = 1;:::;n,
Pn([V [ fug [ fvg][jXj) ¡ Pn([V [ fug][jXj) ¡ Pn([V [ fvg][jXj) + Pn([V ][jXj) · 0: (3.7)
The problem of checking whether µ is in the con¯dence regions can then be solved in polynomial
time. Moreover, since submodular optimization has far ranging applications in all areas of operations
research, many extremely e±cient algorithms and implementations are readily available.
4. Simulation based on Example 1
We now illustrate and assess the performance of our procedure on the game described in Exam-
ple 1. Throughout the experiment, we assume that ("1;"2) is uniformly distributed on [¡1=2;1=2]2
and J = (J1;J2) is a vector of independent Bernoulli(1=2) random variables. True values for the
parameters are indicated with a 0 subscript. We consider the following true parameter speci¯cations:
(¯0;c0) = (0;0) (point identi¯ed case) and (¯0;c0) = (0;1=4) (which corresponds in some sense to
the greatest possible indeterminacy). For the true data generating process, we consider two distinct
equilibrium selection rules (which, like the true parameter values, are of course supposed unknown in
the inference procedure). The ¯rst rule speci¯es that in case of multiplicity, all equilibrium strategy
pro¯les in the equilibrium correspondence are selected with equal probability: we call this case \uni-
form selection". The second selection rule speci¯es that in case of multiplicity, the equilibrium with
largest aggregate investment is selected; suppose for instance that the equilibrium correspondence
takes the value fHH;HL;LOg, then equilibrium strategy pro¯le HH is realized: we call this case
\maximal selection". In the case of maximal selection with c0 = 0:25, ¯0 = 0 is assumed known a
priori by the analyst performing inference (to avoid an unbounded identi¯ed set in the simulations).
In the remaining 3 cases, ¯0 is unknown a priori. The experiment is run as follows. We calculate
in each of the 4 cases above the distribution of the true data generating process. With the latter,
we compute the identi¯ed set. In the point identi¯ed case, the identi¯ed set is equal to the true
value. In the case c0 = 0:25, with ¯ = 0 known a priori and maximal selection, the identi¯ed set
is [0:2113;0:3333] as explained in the example at the end of Section 2. In case (c0 = 0:25;¯0 = 0)
with uniform selection, the identi¯ed set projects to [0;0:375] on the c coordinate and to [0;0:320]INFERENCE IN GAMES 19
on the ¯ coordinate. We then simulate 5000 samples of sizes n = 100, n = 500 and n = 1000 from
this distribution and construct con¯dence regions for the identi¯ed set using lower probabilities Pn
(based on characterization 2.4), which turned out to have better coverage properties. We use 999
bootstrap replications for the ¯rst two sample sizes, and 399 bootstrap replications for n = 1000.
We consider con¯dence levels 90%, 95% and 99%. Coverage probabilities of the true value and of
the identi¯ed set by the con¯dence region, as computed from the 5000 samples, are displayed in
Table 2 for the data generating process obtained with maximal selection and Table 3 for the data
generating process obtained with uniform selection. Alongside coverage of the identi¯ed set and of
the true value, we report the e®ective level at which Condition (3.5) is satis¯ed to directly assess
the bootstrap functional quantile approximation. Monte Carlo coverage of the identi¯ed set is close
to the theoretical level in the case of maximal selection and tends to be very high in case of uniform
selection. In cases of maximal and uniform selection alike, coverage of Condition (3.5) is almost
identical to point coverage in the point identi¯ed case (c0 = 0), but lower in the set identi¯ed case
(c0 = 0:25). Overall the procedure over rejects in all but 13 out of a possible 90 cases. Improvements
with sample size occur only in 21 cases (out of a possible 60). These improvements tend to occur
when going from n = 500 to n = 1000 and given the nonparametric procedure, there are doubt as
to the accuracy of the procedure for n = 100. Finally, the coverage of the true value (as opposed to
the whole identi¯ed set) is only marginally greater than the coverage of the whole identi¯ed set.
5. Application to long term elderly care decisions
We estimate the determinants of long term care option choices for elderly parents in American
families. The model we use closely follows the one proposed by Engers and Stern (2002) who present
these choices as the result of a non family participation game. The family members decide simultane-
ously whether to participate in a family reunion where the care option maximizing the participants'
utility is chosen. Pro¯ts are then split among these participants according to some bene¯t-sharing
rule. The data consists of a sample of 1;212 elderly Americans with two children drawn from the
National Long Term Care Survey, sponsored by the National Institute of Aging and conducted by
the Duke University Center for Demographic Studies under Grant number U01-AG007198, Duke
(1999). Elderly people were interviewed in 1984 about their living and care arrangements. The
survey questions include gender and age of the children, the distance between homes of the elderly
parent and each of the children, the disability status of the elderly parent (where disability is referred
to as problems with \Activities of Daily Living or Instrumental Activities of Daily Living (ADL)")
and the number of days per week each of the children devotes to the care of the elderly parent.
The dependent variable is the care provision for the parent. The parent is asked to list children20 MARC HENRY, ROMUALD M¶ EANGO AND MAURICE QUEYRANNE
Table 2. Coverage probabilities of (®0;¯0) and of the identi¯ed set by the con¯dence
region, as computed from 5000 samples. The last column shows the level at which Con-
dition (3.5) is satis¯ed. Case, where the data generating process obtained with maximal
selection.
(®0;¯0) n Level Point Coverage Set Coverage Condition (3.5)
(0;0) 100 0.99 - 0.9826 0.9792
0.95 - 0.9574 0.9564
0.90 - 0.9324 0.9392
500 0.99 - 0.9894 0.9894
0.95 - 0.9770 0.9760
0.90 - 0.9592 0.9584
1000 0.99 - 0.9714 0.9712
0.95 - 0.9564 0.9554
0.90 - 0.9362 0.9352
(0:5;0) 100 0.99 0.9364 0.9364 0.9286
0.95 0.9356 0.9354 0.9122
0.90 0.9232 0.9220 0.8830
500 0.99 0.9906 0.9902 0.9656
0.95 0.9810 0.9804 0.9518
0.90 0.9640 0.9632 0.9330
1000 0.99 0.9878 0.9870 0.9772
0.95 0.9746 0.9730 0.9532
0.90 0.9594 0.9570 0.9210
(either at home or away from home) and how much each provides help. If only one child is listed as
providing signi¯cant help, that child is designated the primary care giver. If more than one child is
listed, the one providing the most time is designated the primary care giver. If the elderly parent
lives in a nursing home, then the nursing home is the primary care giver. If no child is listed and
the parent does not live in a nursing home, then the parent is designated as \living alone". Table 4
presents the list of variables used in the analysis. They include parent characteristics, characteristicsINFERENCE IN GAMES 21
Table 3. Coverage probabilities of (®0;¯0) and of the identi¯ed set by the con¯dence
region, as computed from 5000 samples. The last column shows the level at which condition
(3.5) is satis¯ed. Case where the data generating process is obtained with uniform selection.
(®0;¯0) n Level Point Coverage Set Coverage Condition (3.5)
(0;0) 100 0.99 - 0.9872 0.9846
0.95 - 0.9784 0.9746
0.90 - 0.9680 0.9652
500 0.99 - 0.9950 0.9944
0.95 - 0.9886 0.9872
0.90 - 0.9814 0.9794
1000 0.99 - 0.9790 0.9738
0.95 - 0.9706 0.9640
0.90 - 0.9628 0.9548
(0:5;0) 100 0.99 0.9998 0.9986 0.9850
0.95 0.9998 0.9984 0.9792
0.90 0.9998 0.9978 0.9704
500 0.99 1.0000 0.9996 0.9850
0.95 1.0000 0.9974 0.9664
0.90 1.0000 0.9980 0.9382
1000 0.99 1.0000 0.9964 0.9792
0.95 1.0000 0.9956 0.9694
0.90 1.0000 0.9938 0.9578
of the children and the care option chosen. A more detailed discussion and summary statistics and
additional results can be found in the supplementary material.
5.1. The game. The observable choice of care option is modeled as in Engers and Stern (2002) as
the outcome of a family bargaining game. We index family members as follows. Parent: 0, Firstborn
child: 1 and Second born child: 2. The payo® to family member i, i = 0;1;2, is the sum of three
terms. The ¯rst term Vij is the value to parent 0 and to child i of care option j, where j 2 1;2
means child j becomes the primary care giver, j = 0 means the parent remains self-reliant and j = 3,
the parent is moved to a nursing home. The matrix V = (Vij)ij is known to both children and the22 MARC HENRY, ROMUALD M¶ EANGO AND MAURICE QUEYRANNE
Variables Equal to 1 if: Percentage of sample
Care Option
Living with child 1 26.81
Living with child 2 6.75
Living in nursing home 19.92
Living home alone 46.54
Parent Variables
DA Highly disabled 33.81
DM Living with the spouse 40.36
Children Variables
DD Living with parent 11.55
DD1 Distance from parent: 31 min and more 49.45
DS Female 49.26
Table 4. List of variables.
parent. We suppose it takes the form
Vij = °ij + W¯ij + ZjÃij
where W indicates the characteristics of the parents (DA and DM), and Zj indicates the character-
istics of care option j (DS, DD1 and DD2) and X = (W;Z). µ = (°ij;¯ij;Ãij)0 is unknown to the
analyst and the object of inference.
Example 2. Consider the following family, in which the matrix where given value of X and µ result






0 0 0 ¡1
0 4 ¡1 1





Rows indicate family member i = 0;1;2, and columns represents care giving options j = 0;1;2;3,
in that order. In this example, the parent is indi®erent between all the care options, except the one
where she has to move to the Nursing home. Each child prefers to be the primary care giver to any
other care option, followed by the parent living in a nursing home, living at home and being taken
care of by the other child, in that order.INFERENCE IN GAMES 23
The second term in the payo® results from the family bargaining process as follows. We assume
that it is always in the interest of the parent to attend the family reunion. However, child i (i = 1;2)
can refrain from participating in the meeting. By choosing not to participate, a member of the family
agrees on whatever is decided but can neither assume the role of primary care giver, nor can he be
involved in any side payment. Both children simultaneously decide whether or not to participate in
the long term care decision. Suppose M is the set of children who participate. The option chosen
is option j 2 M [ f0;3g which maximizes the participants's total utility
P
i2M Vij. It is assumed
that participants abide by the decision and that bene¯ts are then shared equally among parent and
children participating in the decision through a monetary transfer si, which is the second term in
the children's payo®. The third term ²i in the payo® is a random bene¯t from participation, which
is 0 for children who decide not to participate and distributed according to absolutely continuous
distribution º(:jµ) for each child who participates. All children observe the realizations of ², whereas
the analyst only knows its distribution. The Payo® matrix is given in Table 5, where overall bene¯t
shares wIJ
i , i = 1;2, I;J = N;P are de¯ned and derived in the supplementary appendix. Multiple
Nash equilibria in pure and mixed strategies are also derived in the appendix. Each equilibrium
action pro¯le results in a (almost surely) unique care option choice, hence for each participation
shock ², we can derive G(²jX;µ) as the set of probability measures on the set of care options
f0;1;2;3g induced by mixed strategy pro¯les, which are probabilities on the set of participation
pro¯les fNN;NP;PN;PPg.
Child 2




1 ;"2 + wNP
2
P "1 + wPN
1 ;wPN
2 "1 + wPP;"2 + wPP
Table 5. Payo®s for the family participation game.24 MARC HENRY, ROMUALD M¶ EANGO AND MAURICE QUEYRANNE
5.2. Speci¯cation. We provide estimates for the following utility speci¯cation (an alternative with












































































Recall that the columns indicate the options, in the following order f0;1;2;3g, and the rows represent
each member of the family, in the following order Parent, Child 1, Child 2. For example, the value
the ¯rst born child (family member 1) living less than 30 minutes away from the parent's home
attaches to the fact that she takes care of a non disabled, non-married parent is measured by ¯11,
whereas for a disabled parent, it is ¯11 + ¯ac.
5.3. Estimation methodology. The methodology proposed in the paper allows the construction
of the identi¯ed set based on the hypothetical knowledge of the true distribution of the data. As
described in Section 3, we account for sampling uncertainty and control the level of con¯dence by
constructing set functions A 7! P(AjX), which dominate P(AjX) (uniformly over A µ f0;1;2;3g
and X) with probability 1 ¡ ® (the chosen level of con¯dence, here 0:95). We implement the
method detailed in Section 3 (except that the pairs or cases bootstrap was used instead of the
nonparametric bootstrap advocated above) with a number of bootstrap replications B = 2500.
Second, we obtain the model likelihood by simulating the valuation matrix and computing the
Equilibrium correspondence from the payo® matrix, for given values of X and µ. The procedure is
as follow. For a given X and µ,
² We generate and store R draws of " from the distribution ºµ. Here, R = 5000 and ºµ is
normally distributed with mean ¹ and variance ¾2
", where (¹;¾2
") belong to the parameter µ.
² For each value "r, we compute the valuation matrix V (X;"r;µ) and the corresponding payo®
matrix.
² Then, we determine the equilibrium correspondence G(X;";µ) from the analytical results
derived in the preceding section. The Gambit software provides an alternative for computing
numerically the set NE for more complex games.INFERENCE IN GAMES 25
² The last step of the simulation is to compute an estimator of the model likelihood L de¯ned




minf¾ (A) : ¾ 2 G(X;"r;µ)g.
Having constructed those two elements, the identi¯ed set comprises all values of µ such that for
all observed values of the explanatory variables, the minimum over A µ f0;1;2;3g of the function
P(AjX;µ) ¡ ^ L(AjX;µ) is non negative, as explained in Section 3. We construct an n-dimensional
grid to conduct the search over the parameter space. Each value of the parameter can be tested
in a fraction of a second on a standard laptop, and a region of small dimensionality (1 to 4) can
be constructed in a few hours, again on a standard laptop without parallel processing. However,
estimation time grows exponentially with the number of parameters induced by the model. In our
case, each speci¯cation involves a 12-dimensional parameter space. Parallel processing becomes
therefore necessary. We use an Open-MP procedure for parallel processing, which is perfectly suited
to the method we propose. The computation resources have been provided by the R¶ eseau Qu¶ eb¶ ecois
de Calcul de Haute Performance (RQCHP). All computation where made under the system \Cottos"
which provides up to 128 computation nodes (1024 CPU cores) equipped with two Intel Xeon E5462
quad-core processors at 3 GHz. Under 1 node, approximately 107 parameters points can be tested
in 24 hours.
5.4. Results. We perform the estimation under di®erent values of the mean and variance of the
error term. To alleviate the computational burden, we ¯rst test the signi¯cance of some of the
individual parameters by checking whether the hyper planes de¯ned by µi = 0 - where µi is a
component of µ - intersect the 95% con¯dence region. We fail to reject the Null Hypothesis if the
estimation procedure returns a non-empty set. We then obtain a constrained con¯dence region for
the remaining parameters. For each value of mean and variance of the error term, we ¯nd a non
empty intersection between the con¯dence region and the hyperplane de¯ned by ¯11 = 0. This
means we fail to reject (at the 5% level) the null hypothesis that there is no additional constant
disutility for a child to take care of an elderly parent. Since, this hypothesis is not rejected, we
obtain a constrained con¯dence region for the remaining parameters. We then obtain con¯dence
regions for di®erent values of ¯11 and discuss the latter's e®ect on the regions. We note that the
Null hypothesis H0 : ¯00 = 0 is always rejected. Hence, when we control for all other e®ects, parents
are not indi®erent between the ¯rst two options. They show a clear preference in favor of living
in their own home (option called \living alone") instead of living in a nursing home (¯00 is always
positive). The results we present are then for given values of ¯00. We provide an insight of how
di®erent values of this parameter change the results. We report the range for each parameters in
Table 6. Note that the identi¯ed set is not a compact set. In particular, ¯ac; ¯ah, ¯m and Ã are
allowed to diverge to ¡1. Results are generally consistent with expectations and previous results26 MARC HENRY, ROMUALD M¶ EANGO AND MAURICE QUEYRANNE
Parameters Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max
¯00 2 2 3 3 1 1 1 1
¯11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
¯ah ¡1 -3.57 ¡1 -3.57 ¡1 -2.86 ¡1 -2.14
¯ac = ¡¯m ¡1 -2.86 ¡1 -2.86 ¡1 -3.57 ¡1 -3.57
® 0.00 8.00 0.00 8.00 1.00 5.00 0.00 4.00
Ãs 0.00 5.00 0.00 4.00 1.00 4.00 0.00 2.00
Ãd ¡1 -2.86 ¡1 -2.14 ¡1 -1.43 ¡1 -3.57
¹ -1 -1 0 0 -1 -1 0 0
¾" 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
¾2
u 1 1 1 1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
p» 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Table 6. Parameters Range for estimation of Speci¯cation 1 at ¯11 =
0, ¯ac = ¡¯m and for di®erent values of the error terms and of ¯00.
on the subject. Namely:
(1) The existence of several problems with the parent's functional ability is a key determinant
of the decision to enter a nursing home. ¯ah and ¯ac are both negative and can both be
(very) large. The negative sign of ¯ah captures the fact that a parent's disability increases
the value of care provided by the family or a specialized institution. In addition, ¯ac < 0
means that the disability entails a utility cost for the child if he is chosen as primary care
giver.
(2) Parameter ¯m associated with the parent living with a spouse is positive and large. This
implies that married parents are more likely to remain self-reliant. In families where the
parent is disabled, the e®ect of living with the spouse compensates the disutility of disability
and preserves the incentive for parents to live at home.
(3) While we cannot rule out parents being indi®erent to the gender or birth order of their
primary care giver, estimation shows a tilt of the con¯dence interval toward positive values
for both parameters, with a possible positive and large magnitude of the parameter ®. In
case ¹ = ¡1 and ¾2
u = 0:25, the data reveal that parents exhibit a preference for an older
and for a female care giver.INFERENCE IN GAMES 27
(4) Children living more than 30 minutes from the parents are less likely to provide care than
those living closer to the parents. Distance has a (possibly strong) disutility e®ect on
children's incentives to participate in the care decision.
The shape of the con¯dence region also conveys a considerable amount of information. Figure 3
shows two dimensional dimensional projections and cuts of the con¯dence region for column 2 of
Table 6, i.e ¹" = 0, ¾2
" = 1, ¾2
u = 1. Of great interest is the projection of the identi¯ed set in the
plan ¯ah;¯m. Figure 3(a) reveals an almost linear relation between the two parameters of the type
¯ah = ¡¯m. The estimation rejects models for which the absolute value of the two parameters are
signi¯catively di®erent. The data suggest therefore that the disutility induced by the disability of
the parent can be entirely compensated by the presence of a spouse in the same household. Notice
the triangular shape of the region plotted in Figure 3(b) which entails that simultaneous large values
of Ãs and ® are rejected. This ¯nding means that only one of the e®ects (gender or birth order)
can be large, not both. In other words, ¯rstborn daughter are not the only possible care givers.
Note also that both e®ects can be very small, though not jointly insigni¯cant. We observe similar
types of constraints for the pairs (®;¯ah), (®;¯ac), (®;Ãd), (Ãs;¯ac), (Ãs;Ãd) as large values of
parameters ® or Ãs are only permitted when the other parameters are jointly large (see Figure 3(c)
to 3(f)). For example, we obtain a constrained con¯dence region at ¯ac = ¡3:5. The ranges for
the two parameters, ® and Ãs, are tighter, as ® 2 [1;2] and Ã 2 [0;1]. Figure 4 shows the e®ect of
the variation of parameter ¯11 on Ãs and ®. Recall that ¯11 represents a ¯xed cost or bene¯t for
the child chosen as care giver. We observe negative relations between ¯11 and Ãs, and ¯11 and ®.
Negative values of Ãs and ® are only admissible for positive values of ¯11. Hence a model where
parents exhibit no favoritism for a daughter and/or a ¯rstborn, or favoritism for a son and/or a
second born, will be consistent with our data if and only if there exist a strictly positive constant
bene¯t for a child to be caregiver.
Conclusion
We have considered the problem of statistical inference in incomplete partially identi¯ed struc-
tural models, such as models of discrete choice with interactions and other forms of endogeneity.
A characterization of the identi¯ed set for structural parameters was given, with an appeal to a
classical theorem in combinatorial optimization, the Max-Flow Min-Cut Theorem, thereby empha-
sizing the optimization formulation of the problem of inference in such models. Finally, we have
shown how to apply combinatorial optimization methods within a bootstrap procedure in order to
compute informative con¯dence regions very e±ciently, hence feasibly in empirically relevant appli-
cations. An application of the methodology was carried out on a family bargaining example and28 MARC HENRY, ROMUALD M¶ EANGO AND MAURICE QUEYRANNE
it was shown that most ¯ndings in the literature on the determinants of long term elderly care by
American families were supported in this more robust framework, where the e®ects of interaction
are accounted for. This procedure applies to very general classes of models and its e±ciency and
coverage properties could no doubt be improved, when tailored to more speci¯c applications. In
particular, the application to matching games and revealed preference testing of stability in match-
ing still poses considerable challenges. Other perspectives for further work include the application
of Max-Flow Min-Cut algorithms to the detection of redundant inequalities at the identi¯cation
stage, to improve the performance at the inference stage, possibly by appealing to other existing
procedures if the number of non redundant inequalities is small enough.
Appendix A. Proofs of results in the main text
Proof of Theorem 1. By Proposition 1 of Galichon and Henry (2011), a value µ of the parameter
vector belongs to £I(P) if and only if P(Y 2 G(X;";µ)) = 1, X-a.s. (which we drop from the
notation from this point on). Hence if there exists a pair (Y;U) of random vectors on Y £ U
such that Y has probability mass P(yjX), y 2 Y, U has probability mass Q(ujX;µ), u 2 U, and
P(Y 2 UjX) = 1. This is equivalent to the existence of non negative weights ¼u







y = Q(ujX), and ¼u
y = 0 when y = 2 u. The latter is equivalent to
the following programming problem with auxiliary variables ay, y 2 Y and au, u 2 U having zero








y + ay · P(yjX),
P
y2Y ¼u
y + au · Q(ujX;µ), ay, au, ¼u
y ¸ 0, and ¼u
y = 0 when






























y · Q(ujX), ¼u
y ¸ 0 and ¼u
y = 0 when y = 2 u. This is called a maximum
°ow problem, i.e. the problem of maximizing quantity °owing through a network under capacity
constraints. A network is a collection of nodes, including a source S and a sink T, and directed edges
between the nodes. For instance, (N1;N2) is an edge leading from node N1 to node N2. Here the
network involved in the maximum °ow problem is comprised of a source S, K nodes corresponding
to the K elements of Y, J nodes corresponding to the J elements of U and a sink T. The source
S is connected to each of the nodes y1;:::;yk in Y. A node y 2 Y is connected to a node u 2 U if
and only if y 2 u. All nodes u1;:::;uJ in U are connected to the sink T. To each edge is attached a
capacity, which is the maximum amount that can °ow through it. Capacity is constrained to P(yjX)
between S and node y. Capacity is unconstrained (i.e. in¯nite) between node y and node u such
that y 2 u. The capacity of edges between a node u and the sink T is constrained to Q(ujX;µ).INFERENCE IN GAMES 29
We have shown that µ 2 £I if and only if the maximum °ow in the network described above is
equal to 1. We now appeal to a classical result in combinatorial optimization called the Max-Flow
Min-Cut Theorem, see for instance Theorem 10.3 page 150 of Schrijver (2004). A cut through a
network is partition of the nodes into two sets separating the source from the sink. The capacity
of a cut is de¯ned as the sum of the capacities of edges in the network that cross the cut from
the source side to the sink side. Let a cut be de¯ned by the set V of elements of U and the
set Z of elements of Y on the sink side of the cut. Since the capacity of an edge from y to u
such that y 2 u is in¯nite, the cut de¯ned by V and Z has ¯nite capacity if and only if y 2 u and








u2V Q(ujX;µ). A cut has minimum capacity if no node can be moved between
the source side of the cut and the sink side of the cut without increasing capacity, hence if y = 2 u and
u 2 V jointly imply y = 2 Z, hence if Z = V [ =
S
fu : u 2 V g. Therefore, the capacity of a minimum




u2V Q(ujX;µ) = P(V [jX)+1¡Q(V jX;µ). By the Max-
Flow Min-Cut Theorem, the capacity of any minimum cut is equal to the maximum °ow through
the network, hence µ 2 £I(P) if and only if for all subset V of U, P(V [jX) + 1 ¡ Q(V jX;µ) ¸ 1,
i.e. Q(V jX;µ) · P(V [jX), and the result follows. ¤









v2V v P(yjx) =
P
y2unV [ P(yjx) = P(unV [jx), which is
non-increasing in V , hence the result. ¤
Proof of Theorem 2. Given a value µ 2 £I, by Theorem 1, we have supx2X maxV µU(Q(V jx;µ) ¡
P(V [jx)) · 0. Under Assumption 1, supx2X maxV µU(P(V [jx)) ¡ Pn(V [jx)) · 0, with limiting
probability larger than 1 ¡ ®. Hence, with probability at least 1 ¡ ®, supx2X maxV µU(Q(V jx;µ) ¡
Pn(V [jx)) · 0, and thus µ 2 £I(Pn). ¤
Proof of Proposition 1. We ¯rst justify the BRS Step 1 by showing that wb = w0
b for all b. Indeed












[ ^ Pn(yjXj) ¡ ^ Pb
n(yjXj)]
and thus maxAµY ³b
n(AjXj) is attained by selecting all the elements y 2 Y with ^ Pn(yjXj) ¡
^ Pb
n(yjXj) > 0. It follows that w0
b = max1·j·n maxAµY[
P




therefore wb = w0
b. To justify BRS Step 2, let wopt denote the optimum objective value of prob-
lem (3.6). If D fails to include any b such that wb > wopt then maxb= 2D wb > wopt, therefore an
optimal D must include all b such that wb > wopt. On the other hand, if D is any optimal subset
and some b0 2 D satis¯es wb0 · wopt then discarding b0 from D yields a feasible subset Dnfb0g30 MARC HENRY, ROMUALD M¶ EANGO AND MAURICE QUEYRANNE
(since jDnfb0gj < jDj · d) such that maxb2Dnfb0g wb · maxb2D wb hence Dnfb0g is an alternate
optimal solution. Therefore an optimal D consists of all indices b such that wb > wopt. Concerning
the running time, BRS Step 1 requires O(nBjYj) time, and BRS Step 2 requires O(B) time using
a linear time selection (or median-¯nding) algorithm (see Blum, Floyd, Pratt, Rivest, and Tarjan
(1973)). ¤
Proof of Proposition 2. The problem corresponds to the following decision problem: given an n£m
matrix H, an integer k and a target value t, can one ¯nd a subset S µ f1;:::;ng such that jSj ¸ k
and
Pm
i=1 maxj2S Hij · t? Denote (H;k;t) an instance of the latter problem. Consider the well-
known NP-hard decision problem CLIQUE (see for instance section 4.8 page 43 of Schrijver (2004)):
given a graph G = (V;E) and an integer q satisfying 2 · q · jV j, does there exist a subset Q µ V
such that jQj ¸ q and for all i;j 2 V , ij 2 E (i.e. Q is a clique). To any instance (G;q) of
the problem CLIQUE, we associate an instance (H;k;t) of our decision problem, where lines of H
corresponds to vertices of G (elements of V ), columns of H corresponds to edges in G (elements of
E) and Hij = 1 if vertex i belongs to edge j, and 0 otherwise. For any subset S µ E of edges in
G, we have for all i 2 E, maxj2S Hij = 1 if i belongs to at least one element of S, and 0 otherwise.
Hence,
P
i2E maxj2S Hij is the number of vertices that belong to at least one edge in S. De¯ne
k = q(q ¡1)=2 and t = q. Then, a set S of k edges involves at least (hence exactly) q vertices if and
only if S is the set of edges of a CLIQUE. Hence the answer to the decision problem (H;k;t) thus
de¯ned is YES if and only if G contains a CLIQUE with q vertices. Since CLIQUE is NP-complete,
it follows that our decision problem is NP-hard. Since k = O(jV j2) and t = O(jV j), the input size
(in unitary notation) of such instances of our problem is polynomially bounded by the input size (in
unitary or binary notation) ­(jV j) of the corresponding instance of CLIQUE. Hence our decision
problem is NP-hard in the strong sense. ¤
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Figure 3. Two dimensional representations of the con¯dence region
at ¯00 = 3, ¯11 = 0, ¹ = 0, ¾" = 1, ¾u = 1, p» = 0:1INFERENCE IN GAMES 35



















































































(c) (®;Ãs) regions for di®erent values of ¯11
Figure 4. Parameter ¯11 in relation with other parameters: ¯00 = 3,
¹ = 0, ¾" = 1, ¾u = 1, p» = 0:1